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Abstract 
The recent controversy over the granting of patenting rights to three new strains of 
Basmati rice by the US Patent and Trademark Office is used as a case study to analyze 
the impact of incomplete protection of intellectual property. Results suggest that there is 
evidence that the introduction of a competing product that may infringe on India’s 
geographical indicator has harmed Indian producers in key export markets. 
1 
1. Introduction. 
The Trade Related Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement which seeks to harmonize global 
intellectual property laws has been a major factor in strengthening worldwide property 
rights systems. However, since its formulation, the TRIPS agreement has been the subject 
of considerable controversy and a source of concern among developing nations that feel it 
favors developed countries. Particularly, the protection of traditional knowledge has been 
a cause of debate over the granting of property rights to firms for minor alterations of 
traditional practices or varieties. Geographical indications are one aspect of intellectual 
property that may afford protection to traditional knowledge without conferring absolute 
power to any one individual. Yet, many developing countries have failed to take 
advantage of this form of protection, and, argue that the current TRIPS act does not go far 
enough to protect traditional products. This has led to instances of “biopiracy,” at least 
alleged by developing countries.  
   Though there has been a lot of speculation on the impact of TRIPS and the 
strengthening of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) system in developing countries, 
there is still a dearth of empirical studies on the actual impact of ineffectual IPRs.  The 
recent controversy over the granting of patenting rights to three new strains of Basmati 
rice to RiceTec, Inc. by the US Patent and Trademark Office provides a good case study. 
India and Pakistan argue that the US Patent office’s granting of a patent to RiceTec on a 
variant of Basmati severely harmed their export markets. Basmati is a long-grained rice 
that has been grown in the Himalayan foothills of northwest India and Pakistan for 
centuries and is a major source of export revenue. In this study, export trade in Basmati 
rice is used as an example to determine the impact of inadequate protection of intellectual 2 
property.  Thus the main objective of this paper is to determine how much, if at all, the 
introduction of RiceTec’s Basmati variety harmed India’s export markets.  While data 
limitations impacted the empirical analysis, we do feel that enough evidence is provided 
to caution nations to move more quickly to institute policies such as geographical 
indications and that there may be a need to make these indications more specific in future 
trade talks in order to protect traditional varieties.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section two discusses the TRIPS regulations 
pertaining to geographical indications and details the recent controversy surrounding the 
granting of a patent to RiceTec, Inc.  Section three provides a brief description of the 
Basmati rice industry in India. Section four outlines the theoretical and empirical model 
specification and the data used in this study.   Section five presents the results, with 
conclusions and implications discussed in section six. 
 
2.  Background on Geographical Indications and the Trade Related Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS). 
The TRIPS agreement which seeks global harmonization of IP laws came into effect  in 
1995. All countries which are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are 
required to follow the TRIPS guidelines to adopt common global laws for protection of 
intellectual property or face the risk of trade sanctions (WTO, 2004). Developing 
countries often argue that the TRIPS agreement hampers protection of traditional 
knowledge something which is an integral part of the agricultural economies of many 
countries.  The focus of developing countries has largely been patents, the more popular 
form of protection, which they feel is not suitable for protection of traditional knowledge, 3 
as patents grant power to one person. Other forms of protection of intellectual property 
such as trademarks and in particular geographical indications (GI) have been largely 
ignored. In this section, we first look at some of the features of GI that facilitate 
protection of traditional knowledge.  Afterward, we discuss how protections via GI could 
have ameliorated the controversy surrounding the Basmati rice patent granted to RiceTec 
Inc.  
According to TRIPS, geographical indications are defined as “indications which identify 
a good as originating in the territory of a member, or a region or locality in that territory, 
where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin” (Article 22(1)).  The main advantage of giving 
producers rights to the regional names of their products is that it prevents consumers from 
being misled by products having similar names but are in fact imitations (Moran, 1993).    
Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement provides additional protection, but only to 
wines and spirits. Article 23.1 states that wine and spirit producers may not mislead 
consumers as to the geographical origin or the production style of the product.  Also, this 
section prohibits use of the terms “kind,” “type,” “style,” and “imitation” (i.e. “this 
product is a type of Scotch Whiskey”) in order to prevent other producers producing 
similar products from exploiting the reputation built by producers whose products are 
protected under this act.  The, additional protection offered to wines to spirits and other 
commodities, is a bone of contention among many countries.  Negotiations are currently 
underway to extend article 23 in order to provide additional protection to other 
commodities (WTO, The TRIPS Agreement, 2004).  
Article 24 states some exceptions under which geographical indications do not 4 
hold.  If a name associated with a particular geographic origin has become “generic”, that 
is, it is associated with a number of products then the particular name can be used outside 
of the geographical origin, even if the name was originally used to denote a product of 
that region Two examples are cheddar cheese and Dijon mustard.  Article 24 of TRIPS 
also states that “there will be no obligation under this agreement to protect geographical 
indications which are not or cease to be protected in their country of origin.” (WTO, The 
Trips Agreement,2004)  .  Thus, nations using GI must protect their products through 
their own legislation, otherwise the name will be, essentially, up for grabs.  This fact is of 
importance to the present study because India’s legislature, in fact, moved very slowly to 
extend GI protection to its agricultural products such as Basmati. 
 
Basmati Rice Patent (US patent # 5663484): 
Basmati which means the “perfumed one” is a high-quality, long-grain, semi-
dwarf rice that has been grown in the foothills of the Himalayas for thousands of years.  
Basmati rice requires deep fertile soil, cool climate and a short photoperiod.  Therefore it 
is difficult to grow Basmati rice for commercial purposes in other areas.  Nonetheles, a 
Texas rice development company, RiceTec, began producing and exporting a Basmati-
type rice it called “Texmati” in 1985, long before TRIPS.  After TRIPS came about, 
RiceTec sought to obtain a patent on its rice.  On September 2, 1997, RiceTec did obtain 
a patent titled “Basmati rice lines and grains” on the basis of 20 claims made by the 
company in its patent application to the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO).   The patent was for novel rice lines, methods used to make the different 
varieties and determine the rice quality.  Claims 1-14 of the patent pertained to the 5 
general characteristics of rice grown in North America, South America, Central America 
and the Caribbean.  Claims 15 to 17 were for rice grains without any limit to 
geographical indication. Claims 18 to 20 pertained to the specific methods used by 
RiceTec to develop the rice lines. All 20 claims made related to cross-bred rice lines and 
grain developed by RiceTec.  Of the 20 specific claims made by RiceTec, claims 15 to 17 
seemed especially harmful to the Indian export market since they pertained to particular 
characteristics of Basmati grain.  In these claims RiceTec included a claim to 90 percent 
of rice’s germplasm as well as traditional varieties like Bas 370, Taraori, and Basmati 
Karnal cultivated in India.
1  
RiceTec’s claims, nonetheless, were in fact typical characteristics of Basmati rice.  
In fact, the 2-acetyl-1-pyrroline content compound (see footnote 1) is what gives Basmati 
rice its distinct aromatic scent.  Based on the patent granted to RiceTec by the USPTO, 
RiceTec applied for the registration of the trademark “Texmati” with the U.K Trademark 
Registry in 1997. In April 2000, officials of the Indian Agricultural and Processed Food 
Products Export Development Authority (APEDA), a body established for development 
of agricultural commodities and furthering their exports, filed an application with the 
USPTSO to reexamine the Basmati patent, specifically claims 15 through 17.  It took 
APEDA over two years to gather the data to challenge the claim due to the intricacies of 
RiceTec’s claims (Nilacharal 2001; US Patent no. 5,663,484).  Another complication is 
                                                 
1 Specifically, Claim 15 sought patent status on the following characteristics: a rice grain which has a 
starch index which ranges from 27 to 35;  a 2-acetyl-1-pyrroline content around 150 ppb to 2000 ppb.; 
length around 6.2mm to 8.0mm, width ranging from 1.6 mm to 1.9mm and a length/width ratio of around 
3.5 to 4.5; a whole grain index ranging from 41 to 63; a 75% to 150% increase in the length of the grain 
when cooked, and a chalk index less than 20. 
 6 
that under U.S. patent law, a patent can be challenged only after it is granted.  Further, 
challenging an entire patent is complex because if one loses on even one count of the 
claims in the patent the entire patent can be upheld (Ramchandran, 2000).  Soon after 
APEDA’s challenge, RiceTec gave up the right to claim 4 and claims 15 through 17.  
Even with this concession, however, the USPTO found that the 16 remainder claims were 
also questionable.  Subsequently, RiceTec was issued notice by USPTO on March 27, 
2001 that its patent was in jeopardy.  RiceTec then withdrew the remainder claims except 
claims 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 which pertained to new cross bred lines developed by RiceTec 
that are not similar to any of the varieties grown in India, although Rice Tec claims that 
the new rice varieties produce grains “similar or superior to those of good quality 
Basmati rice” (Nilacharal 2001; US Patent no. 5,663,484).    
Thus RiceTec now has a narrow patent on three specific rice varieties developed 
through the company’s own research. However, because it no longer has a patent on 
Basmati lines, it is now prohibited from used the term “Basmati” in marketing its rice.  
Nevertheless, the revised patent does not prohibit RiceTec from marketing its rice as 
similar to Basmati (Damodaran 2001; US Patent no. 5,663,484). 
RiceTec markets “Texmati”, “Kasmati” and “Jasmati” (“Texmati” and “Kasmati” 
are marketed as substitutes to Basmati while “Jasmati” is marketed as the American 
version of Jasmine rice grown in Thailand, which incidentally has a large export market 
in the US and other countries).  Though India was successful in winning the legal battle 
against RiceTec in the US, it still faces legal battles in about 25 countries for 40 different 
cases since TRIPS places the onus on the importing nation, not the exporting nation, of 
deciding whether another nation’s geographical indication of its traditional goods is valid. 7 
According to APEDA of India, these cases are varied and the battle ranges over obtaining 
exclusive control over the Basmati trademark in each country to breach of the 
geographical indication of Basmati. Countries where legal battles are currently waged are 
Brazil, Chile, Greece, Britain, South Africa, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Spain, 
Turkey, Kuwait and Taiwan.  In order to cover the legal costs to fight the cases, the All 
India Rice Exporters’ Association has established a Basmati Development Fund which 
has been collecting Rs 50/tonne (approx $1.09) for Basmati rice exported from India.   
India has also obtained the aid of the Trademark Watch Agency to keep a watch on any 
new trademark applications for Basmati rice or its misleading variations that are filed 
overseas (Nilacharal, 2001).   
Of 40 cases filed, India has been successful in winning 15 cases against countries 
like Britain, Australia, France, Spain, Chile and UAE.  In Spain, APEDA has been 
successful in obtaining a registered trademark for Basmati rice as aromatic rice produced 
in the sub-continent, thus deterring non-Indian or Pakistani food companies from using 
the Basmati brand name.  In Brazil, India has been able to overturn an application for 
using Basmati as a trademark for sweets and condiments. India has also been successful 
in two other cases against RiceTec in Greece and UK (Nilacharal, 2001).  In France a 
food company “Establissments Haudecoeur La Courneuve” was given two trademarks by 
the French government to use the name “Basmati”, specifically, “Riz Long Basmati” and 
“Riz Long Basmati Riz du Monde” (The Economic Times, 1998). 
 The Indian 
government has opposed the trademarks and is awaiting a decision from the French 
Trademark Office.  In Greece, RiceTec filed an application to register “Texmati”, 
“Jasmati” and “Kasmati” as trademarks while in the UK an application was filed to 8 
register “Texmati” as a trademark.  India was able to overturn both applications on the 
grounds that the names were very similar to Basmati rice and therefore very misleading 
(Nilacharal, 2001).  
India could have avoided the legal battle and strengthened Basmati’s position in 
the global market if it had registered Basmati as a geographical indication earlier, 
however, this would have required updating its intellectual property laws, a process 
which has been slow in country without a long history of trademark and patent law.  It 
eventually did so, but by then it came at a cost.   Further, a revamped TRIPS agreement 
that extended article 23 to cover traditional goods, not just wines and spirits, would also 
have prevented RiceTec from marketing its Kasmati brand rice as “traditional Basmati 
style” or the Texmati brand as “American Basmati”.   
In part because of stories like this, India, Switzerland, EU, Czech Republic, 
Morocco and others are advocating for stronger and wider protection for agricultural 
products under Geographical Indications.  However the United States, Australia, and 
New Zealand, who were initially in favor of intellectual property rights and WTO and 
geographical indications for wines and spirits, are opposed to the widening of Article 23 
of the geographical indications to cover other agricultural products that they see as 
mostly generic (RAFI, 2000).   Whether or not to allow imports of products that are 
labeled in a manner misleading to the general public is a discretion exercised by the 
individual importing country.  For example the UK Grain and Feed Trade Association 
which is the largest importer of Basmati rice in Europe, specifically states that only long 
grain rice from India and Pakistan can be labeled as Basmati rice.  Saudi Arabia which is 
the largest importer of Indian Basmati allows only Basmati rice grown in the Indian sub-9 
continent to be labeled as Basmati rice. Therefore, the Indian Basmati is offered 
protection in these countries (BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, 1998).  The United 
States, however, merely considers Basmati to be a generic name like durum wheat.  The 
USA Rice Federation (1998) advocates that “the terms basmati and jasmine refer to types 
or generic classes of aromatic rice and that these terms cover many varieties and broad 
range of qualities. Additionally, these terms are not restricted to products or varieties 
produced in any specific country or groups of countries.”   So far, India cannot obtain a 
trademark for Basmati in the US (Prakash,1998).  
A point to note here is that RiceTec applied for a patent after TRIPS came into 
force. Prior to TRIPS member countries were not required to provide adopt common 
global levels of protection for intellectual property. Therefore, there was little India could 
to obtain GI for Basmati rice in the United Sates. 
Another problem relates to the fact that Basmati is not literally associated with a 
place. For example “Champagne” is named after the champagne region of France where 
the wine is produced. Also, Basmati exporters and producers do not label the rice so as to 
link the geographical origin with the product.  Most Basmati rice packages usually print 
only the country of origin on the label (Prakash, 1998). 
As stated in article 24, in order for GIs to be protected in other member countries,  
,they must be protected  under national law in their country of origin, something which 
India has been very slow to accomplish.  Though the Indian government passed the 
Geographical Indication of Goods (Registration and Protection) Bill in 1999, currently, 
only Darjeeling tea is protected under this Act.   Further, a national registry of the goods 
offered protection under this Act still needs to be established and the manner in which 10 
protection and registration will be offered is still to be determined (Ramchandran 2000).   
Two key points that we wish to analyze from the patent granted to RiceTec, are 
whether India suffered any losses in its key export market as results of not providing 
adequate protection to Basmati rice and also to determine whether the extension of article 
23 would benefit India in the many legal cases it currently faces worldwide. 
 
3. Basmati Rice Industry in India –Background: 
In the Basmati rice market India is the largest producer and exporter (ITCIBD, 2003).  Of 
the total production of Basmati rice almost two-thirds is exported (Bhattacharjee et al., 
2002).  The total world demand for Basmati rice is around 1.18 million tons and is valued 
at $700 million (Padmanabhan, 2003).  The majority of the exports are to the Middle-East 
while a small percentage of Basmati is exported to Europe and North-America. Saudi 
Arabia is the largest importer of Basmati rice (65% of Indian exports), followed by the 
United Kingdom (15% of Indian exports), Kuwait (10%), U.A.E (5%) and other countries 
(5%) (ITCIBD, 2003).  
The Indian Basmati export market is characterized by a large number of 
exporters.  There are few organized players in the Basmati export market. Of the 600,000 
tons of Basmati exported in 1998 the export share of major exporters was individually 
around 30,000 tones (Damodaran, 2001; Asia Pacific Biotech, 1999).  Many small firms 
accounted for the majority of the Basmati exports. According to the All India Rice 
Exporters Association there are 134 registered Basmati exporters. Of these the major 
exporters are KRBL, Amira foods, DD International, SunStar Overseas, Sutnam Overseas 
and United Exports (Srinivas, 2003).  Of these exporters KRBL is the largest exporter of 11 
Basmati rice to the US commanding a market share of 52-53%. According to APEDA 
(2003), India currently has a 60% share of the Basmati market in the US. This share is 
expected to increase to 75% during the year 2003.    KRBL is also the largest exporter of 
Basmati rice in India, although its export share is less than 10 percent (Business Line 
2002).  The goal for the rest of the paper is to establish how much, if at all, the 
introduction of RiceTec’s products have hurt Indian exports and, by association, how 
India has hurt itself by not advancing its own geographical indication further. 
 
 4. Theoretical Framework. 
The Lerner index (relative markup of price over marginal cost)  defined as  L = (P-MC)/P  
where P is the output price and MC is the marginal cost per unit of output, is 
conventionally used to measure the degree of market power exercised  by a firm in a 
particular market.  However, in practice it is difficult to calculate the Lerner index since it 
requires data on price, and the marginal cost of every firm selling a similar product in a 
particular industry. This problem becomes more complex in an international market 
setting where an exporting country has many firms which export products to many 
destinations and face different competitors in each destination.  Finding price, quantity 
and cost data for each firm is extremely difficult (Goldberg and Knetter,1999).  
Therefore, we use the concept of the residual demand curve proposed by Goldberg and 
Knetter (1999) to determine the impact of the patent granted to RiceTec on India’s 
exports.  A residual demand curve shows the relationship between a particular firm’s 
quantity and price while considering supply functions of all other firms in the same 
market. Thus, a flat residual demand curve indicates that a firm has little control over 12 
prices in the market while a steeper residual demand curve is indicative of the firm’s 
ability to set prices.  Using the relationship between the Lerner index and the inverse 







= , we can determine the extent of market 
power enjoyed by a firm.   Our simple test of harm to India from an ineffectual protection 
of intellectual property will be the extent of any change in the export Lerner index after 
RiceTec entered the market. 
A complete analysis of the impact of RiceTec’s products on Basmati demand 
would need a great deal of data to ascertain the two goods’ substitutability.  
Unfortunately, specific firm/variety level data are scarce. Here, we propose a model that 
will nonetheless allow inference to be drawn based upon aspects of the market that are 
observable. Thus, the residual demand elasticity obtained will be used to determine 
whether the Indian Basmati exports enjoy some sort of market power in the various 
importing countries due to distinctness of the product.  If India exercises some degree of 
market power in the Basmati export market then it might be hurt by the entry of RiceTec 
in the market unless it maintains the distinct image of Basmati rice through protection via 
geographical indications. As indicated by Goldberg and Knetter, the benefit of this 
approach is that it is not necessary to estimate cross price elasticities of demand, marginal 
costs or conduct parameters which measure market power. 
  For illustrative purposes, consider the following model where India (I) and other 
(R) producers who market a competing rice to Basmati are considered.  For simplicity of 
the explication assume these other producers are in a single country like the US.  Let P
I 






i q  where 
I
i q  is the quantity exported by firm i 13 
in India, Z is a vector of demand shifters. Similarly P
R is the price of the other rice and 
Q
R  is the quantity. Thus, the residual demands for Indian and other rice are given by: 




R, Z)                                         (1) 






R, Z)                                         (2) 
where P
I and P
R are measured in the currencies of the importing nation.  Both Indian and 
other producers ship to another destination country.  Firm i from India chooses quantity 
to maximize profits in the destination country. Thus, firm i from India chooses quantity to 
maximize the profit function: 
I
i π  = P
I.
I




I is India’s exchange rate and C
I is the cost in Indian currency. Similarly firm i in 
the other nation will maximize the profit function: 
                                                           
R
i π  = P
R.
R





R is the US exchange rate and C










(conjectural variation) i  ≠ j; k, l = I, R, then ∀ i = 1,…., N and j = 1,….,M the i
th first- 
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In equations (3) and (4), the first term in the brackets (which we denote by 
k θ , k=I, R) 14 
represents the competitive behavior of exporters among themselves while the second 
term (denoted by 
k φ ) is the interaction between Indian and other exporting firms. 









i s and s , the summation of the 
market shares of the individual export firms in each country where 
II I
ii qs Q =   and  
RR R
jj qs Q = , equations (3) and (4) can be rewritten as follows: 
                                                 
I I I I I Ψ Q MC e P − =                                                       (3’) 
                                                 
R R R R R Ψ Q MC e P − = ,                                                (4’)      
where 
kkk ψθφ =+.  The parameters 
k θ  and 
k ϕ  vary from zero to one, where zero 
implies that the firms are perfectly competitive (P = MC) while one implies that the firms 
act collusively. Thus, ]
k 0,2 ⎡ Ψ∈ ⎣  , since  ]
kk ,φ 0,1 θ ⎡ ∈⎣ . For simplicity, we assume firm 
symmetry and discuss reaction functions in terms of how one nation “reacts” to another. 
Luckily, for our purposes we do not need to estimate 
k Ψ  to answer the simple question 
we have posed in this paper. Following Goldberg and Kentter (1999), if we 
simultaneously solve equations (2) and (4’) we can get the other nation’s reaction 
function with respect to India.  Thus 
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From (5) we can now solve for the residual demand for India as follows: 
 













 is no longer a function of  Q
R. Also e
I and MC
I are the cost shifters 
for India and can be used as instruments to determine the demand as these are excluded 15 
from residual demand curve. 
Empirical Model 
Using the methodology described above our estimating equation for the residual demand 
curve takes the following general linear form: 
                          
II n I
mmm mm m m m00 m m P λη Q α Z β WDD Qε =+ + + ++⋅+                    (7) 
where the subscript m denotes a specific destination market.  
I
m P  is the per-unit export 
price of Indian Basmati, 
I
m Q  is the quantity of Indian Basmati exports to market m, Zm is 
a vector of demand shifters for destination m, 
n
m W is vector of cost shifters for the n 
competitors India has in a particular destination market (but does not include any cost 
shifters for India) and ε m is the error term.  The dummy variable D0 measures the shift in 
demand after RiceTec’s entry in 1985, where 1 represents  RiceTec’s presence and 0 
otherwise.  Finally, D0
I
m Q  is an interaction term measuring the change in slope of the 
demand curve for Indian Basmati after RiceTec’s entry.
2  Separate inverse residual 
demand equations will be specified for the different destinations to which India exports 
Basmati rice. The vector of cost shifters is comprised of two elements. One element 
consists of the cost shifters such as wages expressed in the competitor’s currency and the 
second element consists of the exchange rate between the competitor’s currency and the 
specific destination market.  As Goldeberg and Knetter note, exchange rates are 
especially useful in identifying the residual demand curve since they shift the relative 
costs of different exporting countries.  Since, the quantity exported is an endogenous 
variable, it needs to be instrumented. The appropriate instruments that can be used are 
cost shifters for India since they are not included in the estimating equation but are 
correlated with quantity due to the first order condition. Therefore the exchange rate 
between India and the specific destination country serves as an ideal instrumental 
variable.  
                                                 
2 We also experimented with an additional dummy and interaction variable to measure changes in the slope 
of the demand curve after the granting of a patent to RiceTec in 1997, but, as the related coefficients were 
not statistically significant nor did they alter the results in any significant way, we dropped these variables 
from our model specification to conserve degrees of freedom.   16 
 
Data Sources 
Because of data limitations and the need to find nations that also had a long 
history of imports of both Indian and RiceTec rice, we chose to examine Indian exports to 
four countries: the US, Canada, Kuwait and the UK.  Data on the quantity and value of 
Basmati rice exports from India were obtained from The Foreign Trade Statistics of 
India. These publications publish the annual quantity of Basmati rice exports (in MT) and 
the value (in Rupees) by destination.  The sample period for the study was set from 1970-
2003.   Prior to 1979, The Foreign Trade Statistics of India did no have a separate 
classification for Basmati rice from which to distinguish it from other rice. Therefore, 
rice under the classification, “rice other than parboiled”, is assumed to be Basmati rice. 
Unfortunately, the publication is available in only a few libraries in the US and none of 
the libraries had the complete set of volumes from 1970-2003, and at this writing we are 
still trying to update our data set. For this paper, extrapolations were necessary.  
Specifically, export data for the years 1977, 1980, 1986, 1994, 1995, 1996 and1997 were 
incomplete.  For the years 1977, 1980 and 1986 data were extrapolated by taking the 
average of the preceding and the following year.   For the years 1994-1997 data for total 
Basmati exports (quantity and value) were available but not by destination. Thus from the 
total Basmati exports, data for the four destination countries U.S, U.K, Canada and 
Kuwait used in this analysis were generated using the average share exported to the 
respective countries in the previous five years.  The percentage of exports going to these 
countries was then calculated using the total quantity values. This share percentage was 
used to calculate the export share of the five countries from the total Basmati exports in 17 
the years 1992-1996.   
Data on the annual exchange rates, wholesale price indices, wage rates and 
producer price indices for India and the destination importing countries were obtained 
from annual volumes of the International Financial Statistics over the period 1970-2003. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
Using the empirical methodology specified above, a residual demand curve was 
estimated for India.  A joint estimation for the four destination markets, United States, 
Canada, Kuwait and United Kingdom was performed using the Three Stage Least 
Squares (3SLS) approach to account for the endogenous quantity and the 
contemporaneous correlation between the error terms of the four equations. The 
dependent variable in all four equations was the per unit export price to the destination 
market expressed in the destination market currency. The independent variables used 
were the cost shifters of the competitors, the wholesale price index (wage index was not 
available) in Pakistan (WPAK) and the wage index in US (WUS). In addition, the 
exchange rates between the competitors and the destination market (competitor currency 
per destination market currency) were also used.  PAKUS, PAKUK, PAKCA and 
PAKKU represent the exchange rate between Pakistan and the destination markets US, 
UK, Canada and Kuwait Similarly, USUK, USCA, USKU are the exchange rates 
between the United States and the destination markets UK, Canada and Kuwait. Finally, 
THUS, THUK, THCA and THKU are the exchange rates between Thailand (which 
produces a competing aromatic, non-Basmati, rice) and the destination markets. The 
endogenous variables are QUS, QUK, QCA and QKU, which is the quantity (in tons) 18 
exported by India to the destination markets. D0 is the dummy variable which measures 
the shift in demand after RiceTec’s entry in the market, where 1 represents entry of 
RiceTec’s Texmati (from 1985) and 0 otherwise.  D0US, D0UK, D0CA and DOKU are 
the interactions variables between D0 and the quantity exported for US, UK, Canada and 
Kuwait respectively, which measure the change in the slope of the residual demand curve 
after Texmati’s entry in the market.   The instrumental variables used for the endogenous 
quantity is the wholesale price index for India and exchange rates between India and the 
four destination markets.   
Results for the four destinations markets are reported in Table 1. The  R
2 for all 
four equations ranged from 65% to 80% . The quantity coefficients were negative for all 
four equations but significant for only UK and Kuwait.  Results of particularly interest 
are for the UK and Kuwait markets, traditionally large importers of Indian Basmati. In 
the UK equation, the quantity coefficient was negative and significant at the 1% level of 
significance.  The wage rate in the US had the expected positive correlation indicating 
that an increase in the wage rates in the US raises India’s rival’s costs allowing India to 
set a higher export price for Basmati. The coefficient on the exchange rate between the 
US and UK also had the expected positive sign indicating that an increase in the 
exchange rate between US and UK increases the US’s cost of selling to the UK and thus 
allowing India to charge a higher export price to the UK.   The coefficient on the dummy 
variable, D0, was also significant at the 1% level as was the coefficient on D0UK. In the 
Kuwait equation also the coefficient on quantity exported was negative and significant at 
the 10% level. The coefficient on the dummy variable was also significant at the 10% 
level, indicating that there was a shift in demand after the entry of RiceTec. 19 
   The Lerner indices are reported in Table 2.  The lack of market power that India 
has in the US and Canadian markets is reflective of the fact that India’s Basmati rice 
exports to these countries have been relatively minor in terms of world trade, increasing 
only in the last few years (the coefficients on QUS and QCA incidentally were not 
significant). Of particular interest are the Lerner indices in the UK and Kuwaiti markets 
where both Indian and RiceTec exports are substantial. The Lerner index is 27% in the 
UK market and 14% in Kuwait.  After the entry of RiceTec, these indices drop to 19% in 
the UK market and 5% in the Kuwaiti market.  The decline in the Lerner indices after 
RiceTec’s entry is consistent with the story that India was not able to maintain the 
distinct image of Basmati in the world market.  
 
6. Conclusion and Implications  
Different forms of intellectual property rights protection such as trademarks, 
geographical indications and patents have been around for a long time. But unlike 
industrialized countries that have a long history of protecting their intellectual property, 
the legal protection of intellectual property is still relatively new to developing countries.  
In developing markets, much emphasis has been placed on reducing tariffs and quotas 
with relatively less attention paid to strengthening their intellectual property right system. 
With the advent of TRIPS all developing countries are required to strengthen their IPR 
system. Yet, many developing countries have failed to take much action in this regard as 
we have seen in the case of India.   
We examined the impact of incomplete protection of intellectual property by 
using the recent controversy regarding Basmati rice as an example. Our analysis indicates 20 
that of the four markets studies, the residual demand elasticites for Basmati rice in the 
UK and Kuwait fell after the entry of a competitor, RiceTec, who might not have been 
able to  compete had India been proactive in trademarkking its Basmati variety or had 
TRIPS been more encompassing of traditional commodities as some nations wish. While 
further analysis is warranted because of our current, incomplete data set, our findings are 
consistent with the impact of a substitute good in a differentiated products market.  In 
other words, our findings support India’s claim that Indian Basmati is losing its distinct 
image in certain export markets. While the share of RiceTec’s products are is still small 
in the world Basmati market, the future of Indian Basmati rice exports will depend 
largely on how effectively RiceTec is able to market its rice as well as how successfully 
India preserves the distinct image of Basmati rice.  
Further, the TRIPS agreement pertaining to GI does not offer equal protection to 
other commodities as it does to wines and spirits. As increasing number of countries are 
involved in similar controversies surrounding protecting their traditional commodities 
(e.g Jasmine rice in Thailand or Parmesan cheese in Italy), it is perhaps essential to revisit 
the TRIPS agreement and extend section 23 of the geographical indications to offer 
additional protection to agricultural commodities. At the same time, for developing 
countries to be competitive in the international market, it is as important for them to 
strengthen their intellectual property system as it is to open their markets. Without proper 
national legislation governing intellectual property, TRIPS as it is currently written is not 
of much help.  In the case of India, at the very least, it could have avoided the time and 
money spent in the legal battles around the world had it improved its intellectual property 
system or had TRIPS been more encompassing.  21 
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Table 1: 3SLS Estimates for Indian Basmati  Rice exports to the US, UK, Canada and Kuwait  
Dependant Variables: Export  Price of Indian Basmati Rice Exports in Destination Currency 
  
Variable United States        United Kingdom         Canada             Kuwait 
Constant   76.77***   4.76             -4.57    118.56 
                        (22.87)    (3.66)                             (10.60)    (80.34) 
 
QUS    -0.0024                 
                         (0.0008)   
QUK                     -0.0004*** 
    (0.0006) 
QCA                     -0.0025      
                    (0.0027)                                                       
QKU                               -0.0015*     
                                               (0.0008)          
PAKUS   -52.45 
                                (56.54) 
PAKUK          56.27 
                                                  (55.16)         
PAKCA                       13.13 
                                                                                             (45.19) 
PAKKU          -294.04   
                                                                                                                                                (735.29) 
THUS   570.77     
                (398.53)     
THUK     -328.76 
    (243.80)   
THCA                      -94.13   
                          (236.98)     
T H K U             5 7 . 3 5  
           (5096.88)  
USUK       24.60** 
    (10.87)   
USCA                                   45.94*** 
                        (11.55)   
U S K U             4 8 . 9 7  
                                                                                                                                                 (341.30)                              
 
WUS    -0.200    0.0172**              0.0122                   -0.0046     
                  (0.132)    (0.0532)          (0.1408)                    (0.5532)    
    
WPK    -0.2307***  -0.0979***      -0.3245***                    0.4748* 
    (0.0793)    (0.0322)         (0.7450)                    (0.2696)  
          
D0    -3.018    -7.111***         -6.972     -36.290*    
     (5.260)    (1.985)            (5.640)                   (21.870)  
 
D0US   0.00022 
    (0.0008)                         
D0UK     0.00037*** 
    (0.0626) 
D0CA                       0.00269 
                      (0.0027)   
D0KU            0.00146    
                                                            (0.00095)  
   
R
2    0.736     0.751             0.796    0.684 
DW-stat    1.656             1.806             1.947    1.566 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 24 
Table 2: Inverse Residual Demand Elasticities. 
 
Country  Before entry of Rice Tec*  After Entry of Rice Tec** 
United States         0.12%  2.31% 
 
United Kingdom    27.33%  19.12% 
 
Canada                   4.91%  3.67% 
 
Kuwait                   13.84%  5.69% 
*calculated using average quantities and prices prior to 1984 
**calculated using average quantities and prices after 1984 
     